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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INTER VIVOS TRANSFERS UNDER
SECTIONS 2035-38-TAXATION OF INCOME EARNED
BETWEEN TRANSFER AND DEATH
Under the federal estate tax certain inter vivos transfers of prop-
erty result in the inclusion of the property in the transferor's gross
estate.' The included property is valued as of the date of his death.2
Where the property transferred is income producing, the amount in-
cluded in gross estate could be: (1) the property originally transferred,'
(2) the property originally transferred and all income earned by it be-
tween the transfer and death, or (3) the property originally transferred
and part of the income earned by it between the transfer and death. The
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does not explicitly designate the property
includable, but a few cases and a Treasury regulation have decided the
question in particular fact situations. This note reviews these decisions
and analyzes their rationale. The note also considers whether the pres-
ent law is consistent with sound tax policy and constitutes a proper in-
terpretation of the Code.
I. REviaw OF THE PRESENT LAW AND CONSIDERATION OF
ITS PROBABLE APPLICATION
The federal estate tax requires inclusion in gross estate of property
subject to two types of inter vivos transfers: transfers in contemplation
of death4 and transfers with retention of a string by the transferor.5
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38, quoted in notes 4 and 5 infra.
2. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031(a):
(a) General.-The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be deter-
mined by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at the
time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,
wherever situated.
3. In order to isolate the interim income problem, it is assumed that the property
originally transferred is intact in the hands of the transferee at the transferor's death. It is
realized that when the property has been sold or otherwise disposed of, here are numerous
other valuation problems.
4. INT. Ruv. CODE OF 1954, §2035:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in
contemplation of his death.
(b) APPLIcATiON OF GENERAL RuLE.-If the decedent within a period of 3
years ending with the date of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) trans-
ferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or released
a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or
release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death within the meaning of this section and sections 2038
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The present law on taxation of income earned between the date of the
transfer and the transferor's death distinguishes between these two types
of transfers.
and 2041 (relating to revocable transfers and powers of appointment); but
no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise, or release made before such 3-year
period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036:
(a) GENERAL RULE.--The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise,
under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end
before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the inc-
come therefrom.
(b) LIMITATION ON APPLICATON OF GENERAL RULE.-This section shall not
apply to a transfer made before March 4, 1931; nor to a transfer made after
March 3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932, unless the property transferred would
have been includible in the decedent's gross estate by reason of the amenda-
tory language of the joint resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 Stat. 1516).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2037:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has
at any time after September 7, 1916, made a transfer (except in case of a bona
fida sale for an adequae and full consideration in money or money's worth),
by trust or otherwise, if-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property (but
in the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if such
reversionary interest arose by the express terms of the instrument of
transfer), and the value of such reversionary interest immediately
before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of
such property. [Section (b) on Special Rules omitted.]
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2038:
(a) IN GENERAL.-The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property-
(1) TRANSFERS AFTER JUNE 22, 1936.-To the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in
case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoy-
ment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable)
by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any
other person (without regard to when or from what source the de-
cedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of de-
cedent's death.
(2) TRANSFERS ON OR BEFORE JUNE 22, 1936.-To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (ex-
cept in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the
enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change
through the exercise of a power, either by the decedent alone or in
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Section 2035: Transfers in Contemplation of Death
Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate" and Burns v. Commissioner7 held
that income earned between the inter vivos transfer in contemplation
of death and the transferor's death is not includable in the transferor's
gross estate. That position is also taken in a Treasury regulation.8  The
cases advanced several reasons for this exclusion. One was that a trans-
fer in contemplation of death is completed when made, and therefore
only the property originally transferred should be included.9 Another
was that the Code does not explicitly provide for the inclusion of income
earned by the transferred property and should be strictly construed in
favor of the taxpayer.' A third reason was that the transferor does
not make a transfer of the income." The argument was that since
section 2035 requires a transfer, that transfer releases all the transferor's
interest in the property, including his interest in the income subsequently
earned by it.
The recent Supreme Court decision in United States v. O'Malley 2
may indicate how interim income will be treated in future section 2035
cases. The case dealt with a transfer of property with a retained life
estate and held the income accumulated in a trust includable in the trans-
feror's gross estate, but the Court commented on transfers in contempla-
tion of death. In discussing Gidwitz and Burns, the Court said:
The courts in those cases considered the taxable event to
be a completed inter vivos transfer, not a transfer at death, and
the property includable to be only the property subject to that
transfer. The value of that property, whatever the valuation
date, was apparently deemed an adequate reflection of any
income rights included in the transfer since the grantor retained
no interest in the property and no power over income which
conjunction with any person, to alter, amend, or revoke, or where
the decedent relinquished any such power in contemplation of his
death. Except in the case of transfers made after June 22, 1936, no
interest of the decedent of which he has made a transfer shall be in-
cluded in the gross estate under paragraph (1) unless it is includible
under this paragraph. [Section (b) on Date of Existence of Power
and section (c) on Effect of Disability in Certain Cases omitted.]
6. 196 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1952), acq., 1966-1 Cum. BuLL. 2.
7. 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949), acq., 1966-1 Cum. BuLt. 2.
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1958).
9. Estate of James E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979, 988 (1947), afld sub nom. Burns v. Com-
missioner, 177 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1949).
10. Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739, 741 (5th Cir. 1949).
11. Commissioner v. Gidwitz' Estate, 196 F.2d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1952).
12. 383 U.S. 627 (1966). This case overruled Commissioner v. Estate of McDermott,
222 F.2d 665 (7th Cir. 1955) and Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 284 F.2d 502 (6th
Cir. 1960).
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might justify the addition of subsequently accumulated income
to his own gross estate. Cf. Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443
(1941).18
Thus, the Court recognized that income rights were transferred with
the original transfer of the property, but deemed that the valuation of
the property at death reflected these income rights. The Court imputed
rationale to the courts in Burns and Gidwitz. In recasting these two
decisions, the Court reached an interpretation that might conflict with
prior law in contemplation of death cases. While the two prior cases
did not find a transfer of interim income, O'Malley found a transfer of
the income with the original transfer of the property. The argument
can be made that both the income and the property were transferred in
contemplation of death and therefore should be included in gross estate.
This interpretation of the dicta in O'Malley is weakened by the
Court's citation of Maass v. Higgins.'4 Maass held that income accrued
between the date of death and the alternate valuation date was excluded
from the alternate valuation. The Court reasoned that the valuation
of the property alone at the alternate date included the value of the
income because property is generally valued by considering its anticipated
income. If O'llfalley requires the application of the Maass reasoning
to contemplation of death cases, 5 the valuation of the property at death
would include the value of any income rights included in the original
transfer."8
The O'Malley opinion, by the phrase, "the courts . . . considered
the taxable event to be a completed inter vivos transfer, not a transfer at
13. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 633 (1966).
14. 312 U.S. 443 (1941).
15. Gidwitz applied Maass to reject the Commissioner's argument that the interim
income should be included in gross estate. Burns does not explicitly discuss Maass but
cites it as support for excluding interim income. The tax court has rejected using Maass
in contemplation of death cases, reasoning that the case lacks sufficient closeness. Estate
of James E. Frizzell, 9 T.C. 979 (1947), afld sub nom. Burns v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d
739 (5th Cir. 1949).
16. It seems doubtful that the reasoning in Maass is correct. In rationalizing why
income earned subsequent to the date of death should be excluded from the alternate
valuation, a conclusion which seems correct when reached by different reasoning, the court
maintained that the promise to pay income does not have any market value apart from the
asset and that property is not separately valued for the right to receive interest and the
other ownership elements. This argument is correct for the valuation of property at one
point in time; but the argument seems invalid when the valuation is of the economic
benefit which passed from the transferor to the transferee over a period of time. For
example, assume the transferor transfers property worth $10,000 at the date of transfer, the
property earns $600 between the transfer and death, and the property is still worth
$10,000 at the date of death. The value of the property at death is $10,000; but the value
of the economic benefit received by the transferee, measured at the transferor's death, is
$10,600.
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death . . . ,"' also hints that the Court may believe that the transfer
in contemplation of death should be considered a transfer at death rather
than a transfer inter vivos. Under this interpretation, gross estate would
include both the property and the interim income since both would have
been in the transferor's gross estate had there been no transfer.18
Sections 2036-38: Transfers With a String Attached
In order to include in gross estate property transferred by inter vivos
transfers that do not take effect until the death of the transferor, the
Code has three sections that reach the different varieties of these trans-
fers. 9 All three require a transfer of property with the retention of a
string by the transferor. The sections differ only in the nature of the
interest retained and the identity of the property required to be included
in the transferor's gross estate.20 For purposes of this discussion the
sections can be considered together since there are no significant dif-
ferences.
It is difficult to generalize concerning the treatment of interim in-
come from property transferred with retention of an interest. While the
cases are consistent on the amount of property included in gross estate,
their reasoning is generally unclear, inconsistent with the result, or based
on an inadequate consideration of the problem.
The cases hold that the income accumulated in a trust at death is
includable in gross estate in several situations.' In all of the cases except
one,21 the transferor transferred property to a trust of which he was a
co-trustee with a party or parties not having a substantial adverse in-
terest2 3 and retained the discretionary power as trustee to accumulate or
distribute current income until his death. In these cases the transferor
also retained the discretionary power to distribute corpus,2" the discre-
17. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 633 (1966).
18. Since the cases have dealt only with transfers to a trust, another possible dif-
ficulty is the treatment of interim income when there is a non-trust transfer in contempla-
tion of death. However, there seems to be no reason why non-trust transfers should be
treated differently. The regulation does not distinguish between trust and non-trust trans-
fers. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1958).
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036-38, quoted in note 5 supra.
20. For a brief discussion of intersectional relationships among §§ 2036-38, see WAR-
REN & SURREY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 263 (1961 ed.).
21. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d
590 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950), remanded by stipulation
P-H 1952 FED. TAX SERV. q1 71027 (5th Cir. 1951); Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C.
1164 (1949).
22. Estate of E. A. Showers, supra note 21.
23. Under §§ 2036 and 2038, it would seem that even if the transferor were co-
trustee with a person who had a substantial adverse interest, the accumulated income
would be includible in this instance. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(3) (1958); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2038-1(a) (1958). There is an exception for § 2038 transfers before June 2, 1924.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(d) (1958).
24. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
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tionary power to distribute accumulated income,25 the power to distribute
corpus subject to an ascertainable standard,2" or no power to distribute
corpus." Despite these variations, in all cases the entire corpus (and
thus accumulated income) was included in gross estate under either section
2036(a) (2)2" or both section 2036(a) (2) and section 2038.29
In one other case,3" the transferor did not retain the discretionary
power to accumulate or distribute current income. He transferred prop-
erty to himself as sole trustee, and the trust agreement required him
to accumulate income and add it to corpus, but gave him as trustee the
discretionary power to distribute corpus. The entire trust corpus, in-
cluding accumulated income, was included in gross estate under section
2038. Since the transferor had no control over the accumulation of the
income, the case seems to hold that accumulated income will be taxed as
a part of the corpus at the transferor's death whether or not the transferor
himself decided to accumulate it if the transferor had a string attached
to the accumulated income as a part of corpus at the time of his death.
While it is possible to draw some general conclusions from the
factual situations in the cases litigated, it is difficult to extend them to
other factual situations because of the imprecise reasoning in the cases.
One line of reasoning is that if the retention of a string on the property
itself causes its inclusion in gross estate, the retention of the same string
on the income from the property should cause its inclusion.3 ' This reason-
ing is imprecise because it is concerned only with finding a string attached
to the income; it is not concerned with finding a transfer of the income.
To some extent, the other line of reasoning does recognize the transfer of
income problem, and the cases do find transfers of the income.3 2 In those
cases, however, transfers are found by various methods, each capable of
producing a different result.33
25. Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949).
26. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964).
27. United States v. OMalley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
28. Ibid. The case was decided under the predecessor to § 2036, Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 811 (c) (1) (B).
29. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of Cyrus C. Yaw-
key, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949). The latter case was decided under the predecessors to the cur-
rent Code sections, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c) (1) (B), (d)(1).
30. Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950), remanded by stipulation P-H 1952
FED. TAX SERV. q 71027 (5th Cir. 1951), decided under the predecessor to § 2038, Int.
Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d) (1).
31. Estate of Cyrus C. Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164, 1173 (1949).
32. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966); Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d
590 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950), remanded by stipulation
P-H 1952 FED. TAx SERV. q 71027 (5th Cir. 1951).
33. See note 39 infra and accompanying text for the method whereby transfers were
found by Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964), and Estate of E. A. Show-
ers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950), remanded by stipulation P-H 1952 FED. TAx SERV. q1 71027 (5th
Cir. 1951), and the inclusion it might produce. The interpretation of the methods whereby
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In predicting the treatment of interim income in future section
2036-38 cases, the major obstacle is the O'Malley decision.3 As already
noted, the dicta in the case on contemplation of death transfers is con-
fusing. The holding, which concerns a transfer with a retained life
estate but is also applicable to the other incomplete transfer sections, is
equally perplexing." As one authority points out,36 the reasoning is
subject to three interpretations, each of which would produce a different
result. In O'Malley, however, the Court at least attacked the main prob-
lem in the treatment of interim income: whether there has been a transfer
of the income when income producing property is transferred with re-
tention of a string by the transferor until death.
One interpretation of O'Malley is that the income is transferred when
the property is originally transferred.3 7  If this event is the transfer, it
is arguable, as in the contemplation of death transfers, that Maass ap-
plies and requires the valuation of the property alone including the val-
a transfer was found by O'Malley and the inclusion they might produce are in the text
immediately following.
34. In predicting the treatment of interim income in future §§ 2036-38 cases, there
may be difficulty with non-trust transfers since the litigated cases have all been trust cases.
However, there seems to be no reason why non-trust transfers should be treated differently.
Moreover, a non-trust transfer of property with a string attached is unlikely. Prediction
might also be made difficult by the absence of cases dealing with § 2036(a) (1) (transfer
of property with retention of possession, enjoyment, or income in the transferor) or with
§ 2037 (transfer with a retained reversionary interest). However, because of the similarity
of §§ 2036-38, the cases arising under § 2036(a) (1) and § 2037 should be governed by
the reasoning of the cases litigated under §§ 2036(a) (2) and 2038.
35. The Court's transfer language, 383 U.S. 627, 632 (1966):
The dispute in this case relates to ... whether Fabrice had ever "transferred"
the income additions to the trust principal .... [W] e are sure that he had.
At the time Fabrice established these trusts, he owned all of the rights to the
property transferred, a major aspect of which was his right to the present and
future income produced by that property. With the creation of the trusts,
he relinquished all of his rights to income except the power to distribute that
income to the income beneficiaries or to accumulate it and hold it for the
remainder-men of the trusts. He no longer had, for example, the right to
income for his own benefit or to have it distributed to any other than the
trust beneficiaries. Moreover, with respect to the very additions to principal
now at issue, he exercised his retained power to distribute or accumulate
income, choosing to do the latter and thereby adding to the principal of
the trusts. All income increments to trust principal are therefore traceable to
Fabrice himself, by virtue of the original transfer and the exercise of the
power to accumulate. Before the creation of the trusts, Fabrice owned all
rights to the property and to its income. By the time of his death he had
divested himself of all power and control over accumulated income which had
been added to the principal, except the power to deal with the income from
such additions. With respect to each addition to trust principal from accumu-
lated income, Fabrice had dearly made a transfer ... [Citations omitted.]
36. Lowndes & Stephens, Identification of Property Subject to the Federal Estate Tax,
65 Mxci. L. Rav. 105 (1966).
37. See discussion of this interpretation in Lowndes & Stephens, supra note 36, at 109.
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uation of income rights. Or, if Maass does not apply,3" it is arguable
that all income earned between the transfer and death, whether or not
subject to a string at the transferor's death, is includable in the transfer-
or's gross estate since it was part of the original transfer of the property.
Both arguments result in an inclusion of property different from that in
O'Malley wherein the income accumulated in the trust at the transferor's
death was included.
Another interpretation of O'Malley is that the income is transferred
when the transferor-trustee exercises his discretionary power to accumu-
late it. Under this interpretation, future cases might hold that there is
no transfer unless the transferor exercises a power over the income as
it is received. Thus, if the trust agreement required that income be ac-
cumulated or gave a discretionary power to accumulate income to a trustee
who was not the transferor and the transferor retained only the dis-
cretionary power to terminate the trust or a reversionary interest in the
trust, the court would not find a transfer of income by the transferor, and
the income would be excluded from gross estate. Also, this theory of
transfer might require the inclusion of distributed as well as accumulated
income since both are transferred by the transferor's exercise of his
retained power. This is unlikely, however, because the transfer must
be one with a string attached to the property transferred. There is no
string attached to the distributed income. Also, O'Malley included only
accumulated income, not distributed income.
A third interpretation of O'Malley is that the income is transferred
at the transferor's death when the transfer is completed.3" The income
includable is the income subject to a string at the transferor's death. In-
clusion of this amount is in accordance with the amounts included in
the previous section 2036-38 cases4" and in the O'Malley case. The theory
does not find an inter vivos transfer of property which sections 2036-38
require." However, it is arguable that section 2033,' which requires
the inclusion of property in which the decedent had an interest at death,
38. See discussion of whether Maass is applicable to the interim income problem in
inter vivos transfers in note 16 supra.
39. See discussion of this interpretation in Lowndes & Stephens, supra note 36, at 109.
This is the method whereby transfers were found by Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d
590, 595 (1st Cir. 1964), and Estate of E. A. Showers, 14 T.C. 902, 919 (1950), remanded
by stipulation P-H 1952 FaD. TAx SERv. g 71027 (5th Cir. 1951).
40. Round v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1964); Estate of E. A. Showers,
14 T.C. 902 (1950), remanded by stipulation P-H 1952 FED. TAX SERV. 41 71027 (5th Cir.
1951). Also, this reasoning was used for other purposes in Commissioner v. Church, 335
U.S. 632 (1949), and Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
41. Since the sections refer to transfers with retentions in the transferor, the transfer
must be inter vivos.
42. INT. REv. CODa OF 1954, § 2033:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
requires the inclusion in gross estate of the income subject to a string
as of the transferor's death.
II. CONSIDERATION OF TAX POLICY
The review of the present law and consideration of its probable
application indicate an uncertainty concerning how interim income will
be taxed. In general, interim income has been excluded from gross
estate where there has been a section 2035 transfer and has been in-
cluded where there has been a section 2036-38 transfer with retention
of a string on the income at the date of the transferor's death. The
natural question is whether there are overriding tax policy considerations
that cause a different inclusion depending on the type of transfer. The
cases lack discussion of tax policy, but various writers have discussed
the policy reasons for including or excluding interim income. 3
Section 2035: Traisfers in Contemplation of Death
There are several arguments for including interim income in gross
estate when there has been a transfer of income-producing property in
contemplation of death. The first is that exclusion of interim income
creates a tax loophole.44 For example, a transferor who controlled a
closely-held corporation could transfer his stock in contemplation of
death and immediately thereafter declare a substantial extraordinary div-
idend. If the stock were includable in the transferor's gross estate, it
would be valued as of the date of his death.45 Since the dividend would
probably cause the value of the stock to decline, the estate tax would be
computed on a reduced value of the property if the dividend were not
also included in gross estate. This tax loophole could be closed by two
methods other than including all interim corporate distributions in gross
estate. One method would be valuing the property transferred in con-
templation of death as of the date of the original transfer. However,
this solution is impossible without statutory amendment since the Code
requires the valuation of property as of the date of death.46 The other
method would be including the amount of extraordinary dividends in
gross estate. This would require the court to determine whether divi-
dends were ordinary dividends from current income or extraordinary
dividends from the retained income of the corporation, a difficult task
43. 61 HAzv. L. REv. 891 (1948); 54 MicH. L. REv. 577 (1956); 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 149
(1956); 58 YALE L.I. 313 (1949).
44. 54 Mici. L. REv. 577, 579 (1956); 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 149, 151 (1956).
45. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031, quoted in note 2 supra. Also, Helvering v. Hal-
lock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), stated that the valuation is at the death of the transferor.
46. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2031, quoted in note 2 supra.
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in most situations.47 Therefore, including all interim corporate distri-
butions in gross estate seems the best method of closing the tax loophole.
Another argument for including interim income in gross estate when
there has been a transfer in contemplation of death is that one who
transfers income-producing property in contemplation of death has the
motive of keeping the interim income as well as the property itself out
of his gross estate."' Therefore, in order to avoid a tax loophole, both
the property and the interim income should be included in the gross estate
of the transferor. This argument seems valid; taxpayers should not be
prevented from keeping property out of gross estate by a transfer in
contemplation of death but allowed to succeed in keeping its future income
out of gross estate by the same transfer.
Another argument asserts that for administrative simplicity, only
the property originally transferred, and not subsequent income, should
be included in gross estate.49 To evaluate this expediency argument, it
must be remembered that there are further complications if the original
property transferred has been sold or exchanged by the transferee. When
that is the case, the original property is traced to the property acquired
by the transferee, and the substituted property is valued as of the date of
the transferor's death.5" This tracing is difficult in cases involving both
trust and non-trust transfers. In non-trust transfers, it is difficult be-
cause the transferee usually does not have adequate records. In trust
transfers, if there have been distributions of corpus to beneficiaries, there
are the same difficulties of tracing because the beneficiary usually does
not keep adequate records. The intricacies of tracing the original prop-
erty through several dispositions are compounded if income earned by
the original property and by its substitutions must be traced. However,
it is arguable that the tracing of the income earned does not involve
much additional difficulty once the property itself has been traced. Also,
the cases have traced the property even though tracing is intricate.5 The
statutory limit of three years for transfers in contemplation of death
offers some relief. 5
2
Another expediency argument, which assumes that some interim
47. See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
48. 58 YALE L.J. 313, 315 (1949).
49. 61 Huwv. L. REv. 891, 892 (1948).
50. Increases in the value of the original property transferred through sales of that
property and reinvestment of the proceeds in other property have been held includible in
the gross estate. In re Kroger's Estate, 145 F.2d 901 (6th Cir. 1944); Holderness v. Com-
missioner, 86 F.2d 137 (4th Cir. 1936); Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir.
1935); Estate of Daniel Guggenheim, 40 B.T.A. 181 (1939). But cf., Humphrey's Estate
v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1947).
51. Ibid.
52. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2035, quoted in note 4 supra.
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receipts are includable in gross estate, is that including all receipts is
easier than distinguishing between receipts of income and receipts of
principal in order to include only receipts of principal." Separating
principal from income in the law of trusts when there are separate in-
come and principal beneficiaries creates the same problem.5 4 Statutes
have been passed to solve the problem for trusts ;5 it is evident from the
statutes that the legislatures found equity impossible in some instances.",
When the property transferred is corporate stock, the inclusion of
dividends in gross estate is necessary for consistency with the indirect in-
clusion of interim income in gross estate when dividends are not paid. 7 If
the corporation retains current earnings, the value of the stock generally in-
creases proportionally, and the earnings are included in gross estate
as a part of the property valuation. But when the corporation distributes
current earnings, the income is excluded from gross estate if only the
value of the stock is included. As an alternative to including dividends,
dividends and increases in stock value resulting from retention of earnings
could be excluded in order to have consistency. However, the latter
alternative is not feasible since determining what effect the retained earn-
ings had on stock value would be difficult.
An argument for exclusion of interim income earned by property
transferred in contemplation of death is that the transferor should not
be taxed on what he could not control.58 However, the transferor is
taxed on the increase in value of the property or the substituted property
between the transfer and death, 9 which he could not control. The estate
tax subjects the transferor to certain risks irrespective of his control.
It might be argued that excluding income earned between transfer and
the date of death is consistent with excluding income earned by property
included in gross estate between the date of death and the alternate valua-
tion date.60 The regulations under section 2032 define included and ex-
cluded property and value only included property at the alternate valuation
date."' In general, the regulations exclude income received between the
53. For example, are the following income or a return of principal: stock dividends,
liquidating dividends, stock rights, income from wasting assets where no provision is made
for depletion, and discount bond increments?
54. 3 ScoTT, TRusTs §§ 232-41 (2d ed. 1956).
55. E.g., Uniform Principal and Income Act; Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act.
56. The problem of treatment of dividends when paid out of earnings retained by
the corporation before the creation of the trust has been solved by a rule which is simple
rather than equitable. The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act § 6(b) adopts the
general rule that cash dividends are income and stock dividends are principal.
57. 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 149, 151 (1956).
58. 58 YALE L.J. 313, 316 (1949).
59. See cases cited in note 50 supra.
60. 61 HAiv. L. Rav. 891 (1948).
61. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d) (1958).
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date of death and the alternate valuation date if the income is earned
during that period.62 The rationale is that only the property existing at
death is valued one year later by this method.
To evaluate this argument it must be determined if consistency is
desirable. Section 2032, which values property includable in gross estate
one year after the date of death, was enacted to prevent an estate's being
confiscated by estate taxes computed on high values of property when
the values decline rapidly soon after the decedent's death.6" Section
2035 was enacted to prevent avoidance of the estate tax by transfers of
property when the transferor contemplates death.64 The latter purpose
is achieved by including what would have been in the transferor's gross
estate had there been no transfer, that is, the property and its interim
income.
This evaluation of tax policy reveals several valid arguments for in-
clusion of the interim income when income-producing property is trans-
ferred in contemplation of death, the strongest being that exclusion from
gross estate creates a tax loophole. The only valid argument for exclusion
is that it is difficult to determine the income earned between the transfer
and death. In balancing the two arguments, it would seem that if at all
possible, the tax loophole should be closed even if administrative con-
venience is sacrificed. Since the present law excludes all interim income
from property transferred in contemplation of death, it is not consistent
with sound tax policy.
Sections 2036-38: Transfers With a String Attached
The tax policy arguments for inclusion or exclusion in gross estate
of interim income when property is transferred with a string attached are
similar to the arguments already presented for transfers in contemplation
of death, with the qualification that only interim income to which a string
is attached is includable. Some contemplation of death arguments for
inclusion and their evaluation are equally applicable to transfers with a
string attached: exclusion may create a tax loophole if a controlling
shareholder transfers closely held corporation stock;5 including all in-
62. For example, the following are excluded if earned between death and the alter-
nate valuation date: interest, rent, and amortization of discount on interest-bearing obli-
gations. Ordinary dividends declared to stockholders of record after death are excluded,
but liquidating dividends or stock dividends are included if paid from income earned
prior to death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d) (1958).
63. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(b) (1) (1958).
64. United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 116 (1931). The definition of "in contem-
plation of death" in the regulations is (1) for the purpose of avoiding death taxes, (2) as
a substitute for a testamentary disposition of the property, or (3) for any other motive
associated with death. Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(c) (1958).
65. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
terim receipts is administratively easier;6" and if corporation stock is
transferred, including dividends paid in gross estate is necessary for con-
sistency.17  The rejection of the exclusion argument that the transferor
should only be taxed on what he controls also applies to transfers with
a string attached."8 The following arguments are different.
The argument that income earned between the transfer and the date
of death should be excluded to be consistent with excluding income earned
by property included in gross estate betweeen the date of death and the
alternate valuation date is also made for transfers with a string attached.
However, consistency again does not seem desirable. Sections 2036-38
were enacted to prevent avoidance of the estate tax by transfers of prop-
erty with the retention of such a string on it that it is not completely
transferred until the transferor's death."9 This purpose is achieved
by including in the transferor's gross estate that property which is not
completely transferred until his death, that is, the property and the interim
income to which he has a string attached as of the date of his death.
To avoid a tax loophole one who transfers income-producing prop-
erty with the retention of a string on the interim income and the property
should be taxed on all the property which is not effectively transferred
until his death. Therefore, both the property and the income subject
to the transferor's retained string at his death (but not necessarily all
the original property or all the interim income) should be included in
gross estate.
The argument for administrative convenience is also different for
section 2036-38 transfers. First, practically all transfers with a string
attached are in trust.7°  Second, since only property subject to a string
at the transferor's death in includable, there is no need to trace property
after it has been distributed to a beneficiary with no further strings at-
tached. Therefore, the gross estate would generally include only the
trust corpus at the transferor's death. This inclusion is expedient for
tax administration because it requires no tracing.
In summary, all tax policy considerations require the inclusion in
gross estate of income accumulated in a trust at the death of the trans-
feror if the property was transferred with a string attached to the
interim income as well as to the property and if the string were still
66. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
68. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
69. This can be concluded from the earlier statutory wording that transfers "in-
tended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death" are included.
Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(b), 39 Stat. 777. This section was the predecessor of
§§ 2036-38.
70. To have an effective string attached to the property, the transfer is generally
made by a formal trust arrangement.
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attached as of the date of his death. The present law on including ac-
cumulated income where there is a string attached seems to be carrying
out this sound tax policy.
III. CONSIDERATION OF PRESENT STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
As noted earlier the review of the present law and consideration of
its probable application indicate an uncertainty concerning how interim
income will be taxed. Also, the consideration of tax policy reveals that
the present law is contrary to sound policy in contemplation of death
cases. The natural question is whether the Code is deficient in these
respects or has simply been misinterpreted.
Sections 2035-38 require inclusion in gross estate of "the value of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent
has at any time made a transfer." Cases and regulations have also
stated that the estate tax is on transfers of property.72 The critical
words for interpretation in applying the statute are, of course, "property"
and "transfer."
The word "property" has several definitions in property law.
Property can be defined as that to which a person has legal title.73 Ap-
plying this definition to interim income, a court would have to conclude
that it is not property if the transferor never held title to it. Another
definition of property is that which a person possesses or has the right
to possess.74 Applying this definition, a court would have to conclude
that interim income is not property unless the transferor had possession
or the right to possession. Property can also be defined as a bundle of
rights. 75  Under this definition, a court would have to conclude that
interim income is property if the transferor had an interest in it.
Sections 2035-38 all contain the wording "the value of all property
to the extent of any interest therein."76 This language seems to militate
71. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2035-38, quoted in notes 4 and 5 supra.
72. E.g., United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 57, 60 (1939); Treas. Reg.
§ 20.0-2(a) (1958). The estate tax was held constitutional in New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921), which made reference to Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41
(1900). The latter case emphasizes that the tax is on a transfer of property.
73. While the Restatement of Property rejects use of "title," RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 10 (1936), the comments point out that in common speech "title" signifies ownership
or facts that result in ownership. Id. comment c.
74. The Restatement of Property, while discussing interests in land, points out a
distinction between possessory and nonpossessory interests. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 7
(1936).
75. This is the property theory used in O'Malley. The Restatement of Property
defines an interest "to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and im-
munities and distributively to mean any one of them." REsrATEMENT, PROPERTY § 5
(1936). It then defines an owner as a "person who has one or more interests." RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY § 10 (1936).
76. Emphasis added.
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against the first two theories which require title or possession. Also,
several decisions have disclaimed finding these particular types of property
for federal estate tax inclusion." Therefore, the definition of property
as any interest seems to be correct.
The real difficulty has been interpreting the word "transfer." If it
is assumed that "transfer" means an act which passes an interest from
the transferor to the transferee, three interpretations of when the trans-
fer of interim income occurs are possible. These three interpretations
and their possible resulting differences in amounts includable in gross
estate were noted earlier in connection with the effect of O'Malley on
the law of transfers with a string attached.78  If income were transferred
when the property was originally transferred, arguments could be made
to exclude or include the interim income depending on whether the
Maass reasoning applies.79 If the income were transferred when the
transferor-trustee, as the income was received, exercised his discretionary
power to accumulate it, then there would be no transfer of income where
the transferor had no discretionary power to exercise, for example,
transfers in contemplation of death, revocable transfers, or transfers
with a reversionary interest. If the income were transferred at the
transferor's death when the transfer was completed, then there would
be no transfer of income in contemplation of death cases where the
transfer is generally completed inter vivos.
It is difficult to determine which interpretation of transfer is cor-
rect, since the statutory language does not exclude any of the three. Since
the three result in such different inclusions, statutory amendment might
be necessary. However, if the legislative intent concerning what property
should be included by sections 2035-38 is clear, statutory amendment is
unnecessary.
The legislative intent of all four sections was to reach substitutes
for testamentary dispositions, either transfers in contemplation of death
or transfers with a string attached until death. The interim income
as well as the property is such a substitute. Therefore, a definition of
transfer that includes interim income earned by property transferred in
contemplation of death and accumulated income earned by property trans-
ferred with a string attached would be the correct one. However, none
of the three transfer theories produce this inclusion of property.
A sound theory can be achieved by modifying the theory that the
income is transferred at the transferor's death when the transfer is com-
77. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946); Porter v. Commissioner,
288 U.S. 436 (1933); Commissioner v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 82 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
78. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
79. See discussion in note 16 supra.
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pleted. The modification is to deem transfers in contemplation of death
also incomplete until the transferor's death."0 Some contemplation of
death cases have held that the property should be treated as remaining
in the ownership of the transferor until his death.8' With the modifica-
tion, the income earned by property transferred in contemplation of
death between the transfer and death would be transferred at death
and includable in gross estate.
At the beginning of the discussion of the transfer theories, it was
assumed that finding an act that passes an item from the transferor to
the transferee was necessary. There are, however, cases involving other
estate tax issues which have dispensed with the requirement of a technical
transfer and have concentrated on whether an economic benefit passed
from the transferor to the transferee.8 2 Using this theory, it is arguable
that retention by the transferor of a string on income until his death
postpones the passing of full economic benefit until the transferor's death.
And transferring income-producing property in contemplation of death
gives the transferee the benefit of the income as well as the property,
whether or not the income was strictly transferred by the transferor. Thus,
under this theory there would be inclusion of income earned between the
transfer and death in contemplation of death cases and of accumulated
income in a trust in those section 2036-38 cases where the transferor re-
80. An interesting effect of deeming the transfer incomplete until death arises in
cases dealing with severance of a joint tenancy in contemplation of death. Section 2040
requires inclusion of property held in joint tenancy in the estate of the joint tenant to the
extent the value of the property is attributable to consideration furnished by him. It
would seem that if a joint tenant severs the joint tenancy in contemplation of death, that
value which would have been included in his gross estate without the severance should
be included. This result would be achieved by deeming the transfer incomplete until
death and therefore taking place at death. Yet cases have held that only the joint tenant's
one-half interest in the property was transferred in contemplation of death, and therefore
only that interest is included in his gross estate. E.g., Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner,
175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Estate of Brockton, 18 T.C. 488 (1952).
An even more complicated situation was presented in United States v. Allen, 293
F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1961). A transfer had been made with the retention of a life estate
subject to inclusion in the gross estate under § 2036. Then the transferor sold her life
interest in contemplation of death. It was argued for the estate: (1) that the transfer of
the life interest was for adequate consideration and therefore not subject to § 2035, and
(2) that there could be no inclusion under § 2036 because there was not an interest in
the property retained for life. The court overcame the first argument by saying the con-
sideration was inadequate because not paid for the property subject to the original transfer
but only for the life interest. The court could have refuted the second argument by saying
the transfer in contemplation of death should be deemed incomplete until death. There-
fore, the property which would have been included had there been no transfer (the original
property transferred with the retained life estate) would have been included under
§ 2036. The court ultimately reached this result by cumbersome reasoning.
81. E.g., Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935).
82. See cases cited in note 77 supra. The argument that economic benefit should be
taxed was advanced in 51 Nw. U.L. Rav. 149, 154 (1956).
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tained a string on the income until his death. This theory seems logical
and results in sound tax policy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of income earned between the date of the transfer in
contemplation of death and the transferor's death and of income ac-
cumulated in a trust subject to strings is sound tax policy. However,
the present law excludes all income earned subsequent to the transfer
in contemplation of death, but includes income accumulated in a trust
when the transfer is one with a string attached. The difficulty in carrying
out sound tax policy has been interpreting the word "transfer" in the
four inter vivos transfer sections. This note suggests that there are two
approaches that would alleviate this difficulty and assure proper inclusion
of the income. One is to deem transfers in contemplation of death in-
complete until death, with the consequence that interim income would be
included in gross estate. The other approach is to dispense with the re-
quirement of a technical transfer of the income and instead determine
the economic benefit passing from the transferor to the transferee either
at death or in contemplation of death.
